

solidarity such as those of Michael Hechter and James Coleman had focused on the interdependence that is characteristic of organic solidarity. These “utilitarian” theories proposed that solidarity exists to the extent that a rational actor would contribute resources to the group. Thus, they emphasize group norms and sanctions against free-riding members that provide incentives to contribute to the group. Markovsky and Lawler’s theory formalized the earlier understanding of group solidarity as primarily emotional in origin, the group-feeling that emerges as members work together. These theories suggest that solidarity results when affective bonds tie members to a group over and above the prospect of individual material gain.

To precisely define solidarity, Markovsky and Lawler’s theory first separated it from the related concept of group cohesion, the forces that bind a group together. They define *cohesion* as the degree to which members are directly related to other members, that is, the “reachability” of the group. *Solidarity* is then specified to obtain in groups that have high reachability and unity of structure. That is, solidary groups have direct relations among group members and a relative absence of cliques or subgroups. Note how well this formal definition captures Durkheim’s original conception of mechanical solidarity as arising in communal groups where all members interact directly with each other as they work on the same tasks. By precisely defining solidarity in relation to the structural properties of groups, the theory gained access to the powerful mathematical tools being developed to analyze properties of naturally occurring social networks. The theory then proposes ways in which emotions engendered during interactions among group members result in individuals forming affective ties to the group as an entity in itself.

Markovsky also contributed to the development of computer simulation as a theoretical tool to help guide social research. Computer simulation as practiced in the social sciences can be primarily empirical, using a continuing stream of data to build models of social phenomena, modeling the economy, for example. Markovsky, however, promotes simulation as a way to specify the assumptions and propositions of a theory by creating virtual actors that embody them. Then as a computer simulation runs, its results represent predictions of the theory. The advantage is that the computer can keep track of the relationships and sequence of interactions among the actors producing testable predictions rigorously derived from the theory. In contrast, a human theorist—unable to manage the complex relationships of many variables through a sequence of interactions—must make intuitive leaps to reach such conclusions. Markovsky’s X-Net simulator for exchange networks embodies the theoretical elements of network exchange theory to make predictions about the amount of resources that various network positions can acquire through a series of exchanges. Another advantage of computer simulation for theorists is its flexibility.

A theorist can change one element of the theory and then, by running the simulation, quickly see how that change will alter the theory’s predictions. The X-Net simulator proved its worth to the development of network exchange theory as it was extended to predict power more precisely in network structures that produce subtle power differences among network positions.

— Michael J. Lovaglia

See also Graph Theoretic Measures of Power; Lawler, Edward; Network Exchange Theory; Theory Construction; Willer, David

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MARX, KARL

Karl Marx (1818–1883) is widely known as the founder of scientific socialism, a revolutionary critic, in his own words, “of all that exists.” Born in Trier, close to the home of the French Revolution, formally educated at Bonn and Berlin, he was initially one of the Young Left Hegelians. His early political journalism led to exile in Brussels, Paris, then finally in London. The circuit was fateful, from German philosophy to French socialism and British political economy. While Lenin later popularised the idea that Marx’s work was a combination of German idealism, French utopian socialism, and British radical political economy, it may be more useful to view these as items on an itinerary. Certainly Marx’s travel and life path was essential to the development of his thought, even if much of it was unplanned. The *Paris Manuscripts* of 1844 have the radical

flavour of Paris as much as the ruminations of the *Grundrisse* (written between 1857 and 1858) ([1953]1973) are evocative of Marx's years spent working in the silence of the Reading Room of the British Museum. Marx was an outsider, whose life took him from the Rhineland to the homeland of the Industrial Revolution in league with his comrade, Friedrich Engels, who was a textiles manufacturer, a capitalist in Manchester. Engels's life experience of the factory production process, as well as his friendship and financial support, were crucial to the fulfillment of Marx's project. There would have been no Marxism without Engels.

Marx's work was much more than German philosophy, French socialism, and British political economy, and while his theory can be characterised as the critique of political economy, bourgeois society, and capital, there are various other aspects that elude Lenin's easy additive formula. Marx was as deeply influenced by the French Romantic Enlighteners such as Rousseau as by the German Romantics such as Schiller. He was as profoundly struck by the philosophical materialism of Feuerbach and even more influenced by the idealism of Hegel. His prose style is animated by Goethe and Shakespeare. His cultural universe, along with that of the German Enlightenment, was formed by the images of classical antiquity and especially by the work of Aristotle. Even as late as *Capital* (1867), Marx is still working in the wake of Aristotle's images of value and of the human as a political creature, or city dweller. Marx's social theory is a brilliant synthesis of Western and critical culture, though its focus is at once specific as it is general: capitalist production itself. Capital, and capitalist production, are at the centre of Marx's work.

If German philosophy opens the stage, and French politics brings Marx to socialism, then it is the critique of political economy that sustains his work from 1844 on. Marx's major works in the critique of political economy—the *Paris Manuscripts*, the *Grundrisse*, the 1859 *Contribution to a Critique of Political Economy*, and *Capital* (1867)—can be seen as ongoing instalments in the research program that dominated his life from 1844. Of course, for Marx, it was a political program too. For knowledge was revolutionary, and the purpose even of the heavy tomes of *Capital* was to bring on the revolution. The *Paris Manuscripts* saw Marx establish the basic ethical problem of capitalism as private property. The basic problem with capitalism was not that it exploited workers economically by extracting surplus value from them, though it did this too. The real problem was that *alienation* denied the possibility of human autonomy, whether in the act of labour, in the appropriation of its material result, in the alienation from other actors or from the species of humankind. The limit of Marx's argument is that it posits an anthropological holism for humans as the image of all things. The implication of the *Paris Manuscripts* is that socialism would involve some kind of return or recovery of

an original state or condition, where the division of labour could be rolled back and specialization overcome. Marx's early work contains a kind of romantic antimodernism. The positive aspect of Marx's early humanism lies in its insistence that social institutions and the prospect of social change result from willed human activity. Humankind solves only such problems as it sets itself. The urgency of this sense is apparent in Marx's famous Eleventh Thesis on Feuerbach—"the philosophers have interpreted the world, thus far, the point, however, is to change it." This was the Marx who later most fully inspired the Western Marxists, such as Gramsci and Lukács, just as the image of alienation hit home on its first English translation into the 1960s to coincide with the radicalism of the social movements that also valued dreams of autonomy and freedom above all else.

By the time of the *Grundrisse*, and after the failure of the 1848 revolutions, urged on by *The Communist Manifesto* of 1848, Marx shifted the focus of revolutionary change from agents to structure, from proletariat to the revolutionary logic of capital itself. *The Communist Manifesto* is a key juncture here, for its mood shifts from condemnation of capitalism to the celebration of its revolutionary dynamo. From this point on, it becomes clear that capitalism for Marx is the precondition of socialism, not its negation. Marx is never without ambivalence, however, and so it is also here, in the *Manifesto*, that Marx revives Goethe's image of the sorcerer's apprentice, indicating a capitalist world not only out of control but beyond control.

The 1859 *Contribution* is best read as a prelude to *Capital*. Its most notorious feature is its *Preface*, where Marx indicates the project of what later is identified as historical materialism. More powerfully, the *Preface* indicates Marx's turn away from Hegel, away from the idea of civil society as a distinct sphere of activity or enquiry, and his turn into political economy itself as the key to social explanation. As Marx puts it, he now believes that the anatomy of bourgeois society is to be found in political economy. In the cruder language of later Marxists, economic base determined political superstructure; economy determined politics and culture. This was a vital moment in the development of Marx's social theory. It signalled the turn away from politics or culture into economy or production. This was the moment of the birth of economism. It was also a significant methodological step in the direction of monocausal explanation. Modernity, for Marx, henceforth meant capital, and this became the lasting strength and weakness of his legacy. Into the twenty-first century, the power of capital via globalization would be overwhelming, as would the larger theoretical sense that modernity was multifocal, vitally propelled not only by capitalism but also by the state and civil society, where only state and civil society might still hope to civilize capitalism.

In the *Grundrisse*, we watch Marx in his theoretical laboratory, puzzling over method, money, the transition from

feudalism to capitalism, and pondering the possibilities of a technologically driven transition from capitalism to socialism via automation. But *Capital* remains his greatest work, the pinnacle of his achievement, at least in its first volume, the only one published under Marx's authority in Marx's lifetime. In *Capital*, structure rules; this is a lifetime away from the passionate prose protesting alienation of the *Paris Manuscripts*, where the sensuous suffering of human creatures dominates. *Capital* is a work of the finest precision, logic, and choreography. Marx plays with Hegelian imagery, shifting as the text proceeds from the level of appearance (the commodity) to that of essence (the capitalist production process). His point in this elaborate form of presentation is that there is a logic of capital and a best single interpretative way into the labyrinth of bourgeois society. The image of the single commodity leads to the brilliant idea of the fetishism of commodities. Whatever the changes across the path of Marx's work, these consistencies persist. Marx's early encounter with Feuerbach leaves him ever aware of the problem of human projection, where we ascribe to what we create (God, capital) the power to create us. Authorship or agency become subsumed in structure. Marx's journey in *Capital* leads through phenomenological appearance to the descent, as in Dante's *Inferno*, into the living hell of the factory. History, or civil society or state, only enters marginally here, in the tenth chapter on the struggles over the length of the working day or the seventh part on enclosure and the primitive accumulation of capitalist relations. Then, remarkably, socialist revolution arrives unannounced in chapter 32 of *Capital*. This is the lyrical passage where the negations are negated, and the expropriations expropriated, the death knell of private property is sounded. Socialism arrives from within the heart of the capitalist vampire.

Perhaps the arrival of socialism as the culmination of *Capital* is less surprising read immanently than contextually, against the larger body of Marx's work. Marx's sense is that the internal logic of capital, toward self-valorization, is also a logic of self-destruction. The idea of "creative destruction" is associated formally with the work of Joseph Schumpeter, but it is also already active in Marx's thinking in *The Communist Manifesto* and *Capital*. Socialism is immanent within capitalist production. This is the conceptual origin of what later becomes known as "automatic Marxism," the idea that socialism is the rational kernel within capitalism, whether emerging through capitalist collapse, through the tendency of the profit rate to fall, through the development of automation, or through the development of proletarian cooperation within the factory. These later Marxian axioms are, however, clearly at variance with the ethical imperative in the early work, where socialism or social change is conceivable only as the result of willed human action or praxis. The later Marx still believes that the emancipation of the working class can only be the work

of the working class itself, but the image of action is framed by that of structure, history, or capital. The distinction between systemic evolution and proletarian revolution becomes blurred.

These tensions between the logic of the work of the early Marx and that of the later Marx became controversial into the 1960s with the English-language translation of Marx's early works. The general tension in debate among Marxists then was described as that between humanism and structure. Structuralist Marxism became intellectually dominant, not least because of its scientific credentials and the failure of the events of May 1968 to become fully revolutionary. Althusser claimed that the earlier Marx was not only a liberal but a different kind of thinker whose later work depended on intellectual rupture after the works of transition such as *The German Ideology* (1845). The question now arose whether Marxism was science or ideology. Marx and Engels liked to think of theirs as scientific socialism, as opposed to the blueprinting desires of their utopian opponents. Marx's work can be associated with the image of *Wissenschaft*, a nonpositivist cultural sensibility that indicates that knowledge is a work of craft and not of proclaiming the truth. At the same time, aspects of his later work bear undeniable resemblance to positivism as we know it in the lawlike sense, claiming to detect the future of humanity through the extrapolation of economic trends such as the concentration of capital and the polarization of classes. Even the 1848 *Communist Manifesto* is structured on the logic of necessity, here indicated by the polarization of bourgeoisie and proletariat into warring camps. As the even younger Marx put it, it was not for him a question of what the proletariat chose but what it was compelled to do.

By the 1980s, Structuralist Marxism had been overtaken by poststructuralism. Humanist Marxism became the object of ridicule in these circles, castigated for the naïveté of the idea that humans create their world. The very idea of humanism became laughable. The mature Marx replaced the young Marx, now to be replaced by Nietzsche, or more literally by Foucault.

A third perspective in the young versus mature Marx controversy asserted continuity, though more along conceptual than political lines. Alienation, for example, could be viewed as an earlier version of the idea of community fetishism. Marx's work could be viewed in its continuity not only as the critique of political economy but as the critique of ideology.

The early Marx criticises bourgeois ideology as false, a representation of the particular interest of the bourgeoisie as though it were general, or universal. Later, in *Capital*, the idea of commodity fetishism also addresses the problem of the way in which capitalist ideology or culture naturalises the existing order of things. At the same time, there is a shift of emphasis from the idea of praxis or sensuous human activity to that of structure across Marx's work and

a corresponding shift from a primary to a secondary emphasis on the role of ideology. For the later Marx, it is the case that bourgeois society reproduces itself less through ideas than through the dull compulsions of everyday life. On this view, the problem is less that capitalism needs to dupe its bearers into inner consent than that there are simply no alternative options available. Capitalism is not the main modern game, it is the only game. The issue is less that we deeply believe in capitalism than that we know no alternatives. For Marx, and those who immediately follow him, however, the alternative is latent within capitalism as socialism itself. The shifts of emphasis across Marx's work remain clear. The early Marx focussed on politics and journalism; the later Marx, on political economy and science. The early Marx focussed on alienation, the later Marx on commodification or reification (the latter becoming a key clue for Lukács). The early Marx privileged activity, or anthropology; the later valued structure. The early Marx was a voluntarist; the later was a structuralist.

There are many Marxes, both in Marx's work and especially for us, who come later. The humanist and ethical impulse of the early Marx was valued politically by the Marx Renaissance in Eastern Europe in work of critics like Heller and Bauman, whose goals were emancipation from the communist regimes that claimed to speak in Marx's name. The later Marx was refigured intellectually as structuralism, where together with Saussure and Freud, Marx's *Capital* was taken as a theory of the commodity sign and the capitalist structure behind it. At the same time, there were other Marxes in Marx's own work. There is the Marx of Rousseau, insisting on direct democracy, or of Schiller, denouncing the fragmentation of the specialized division of labour. There is the classical Marx with Aristotle, denouncing the idea that a shoe is made for exchange, rather than for wearing or spitting at the very idea of the division of labour, insisting that to subdivide a person is to execute that person. There is the Marx (and Engels) of *The German Ideology*, puzzling over anthropology both in its philosophical and physical senses. There is the Marx of the late *Ethnological Notebooks* (1879–1880), now reading Russian, whose thought-processes are so cosmopolitan that he shifts between four languages in one sentence of writing. There is Marx the historian, where some of his finest interpretative moments are registered, for example, in *The Eighteenth Brumaire* (1852), in images of antiquity and masking that pervade in an anticipation of the idea of the invention of tradition. Elsewhere, for example in *The Civil War in France* (1871), Marx both essays contemporary history and shows his hand politically, claiming the Paris Commune as a limited model of socialism.

The question of Marx's political theory is less clear than is his social theory. Marx's social theory begins with the critique of political economy and ends up within it. His political theory is closer in its general sentiments to

Rousseau's enthusiasm for direct democracy. His reflections on the state vary, from the cruder instrumentalist view that the state is merely the tool of the ruling class, to the more nuanced view that it is space for middle-class reformers such as the factory inspectors in *Capital*, or the idea that the state is contested and has its own interests in *The Eighteenth Brumaire*. What is notable here is that the more historically engaged Marx's work becomes, the more classes appear above and beyond the two-class model of the *Manifesto*, and the more complex the role of the state accordingly becomes. If Marx does not have a single, coherent theory of the state, nor does he have a clear theory of politics. His earliest journalism suggests the politics of reform. *The Communist Manifesto* announces the arrival of the Communist Party, but this is a small group of like-minded individuals, not a modern organized party; it precedes the mass party as an organizational form. The Communist Party as Marx conceives it theoretically is the same as the class. As is later the case in the spontaneism of Rosa Luxemburg, the party is the mass, is the class.

This is a hiatus in Marx's thinking that is never resolved. After his death, the German social democrats develop the organised mass party form, and the bolsheviks counterpose the vanguard or combat party to it. Marx has no concept of the vanguard or dictatorial combat party. His use of the image of dictatorship of the proletariat is a metaphor, reminiscent of the Roman history he grew up with in Trier. His model of local democracy, developed in *The Civil War in France*, is based on the three Rs of socialist democracy: rota, recall and relativity (rotation of leaders who are open to recall and paid wage relativity with ordinary workers). Marx has no theory of representative democracy, though he does endorse the idea of an electoral path to socialism late in life, an idea that Engels carries on and Kautsky builds into the culture of classical German social democracy.

By default, there are three avenues of change suggested in different parts of Marx's work. The first, and most powerful, is indicated through the critique of political economy that culminates in *Capital*. Here socialism is the evolutionary stage that follows capitalism, and emerges from within it, embryonically. Organic language, even gynecological, is powerful in Marx's work. The second, which coexists with this image of evolution and also comes to fruition in *Capital*, is the path where proletarian consciousness emerges in and through the production process—cooperation of labour on the factory floor leads to self-management, to the regime of the direct producers. The third, and most troubling, indication of the path of possible change connects consciousness less directly to the proletariat than to the intellectuals who understand capitalism theoretically through the prism of scientific socialism. By the time of the 1859 *Preface*, Marx seems to understand social change as occurring in that moment when structure and agency coincide. If socialists make history but not just as

they please, then socialists—proletarians and intellectuals together—make history when the time for socialism is ripe.

Marx never resolves this question of consciousness, or agency versus structure. If Marxism offers the correct reading of history, and the necessity of socialism is written into the very order of things, why bother with social science at all? Whatever the scientific claims of Marxism, its status as utopia persists. Indeed, there are at least five different images of utopia spread across Marx's work, changing as its own colour does from red or green to grey, as Marx becomes increasingly reconciled to industrialism across the path of his work. The *Paris Manuscripts* contain the image of utopia as the labour of craft. In *The German Ideology*, Marx and Engels offer a second utopia, where they play with the utopia of Fourier in the famous imagery where one could be hunter, herder, fisher, and critic across the path of a single day without ever becoming just one of these. Here the image is that human society should be based on difference, sensuality, and horticulture, Renaissance Man rather than Sparta. By the *Grundrisse*, Marx begins to anticipate a third utopia, shifting freedom beyond labour and into creation itself; automation makes it possible to glimpse utopia beyond labour. By the third volume of *Capital*, later again, Marx confirms in a fourth image of utopia this sense that freedom exists beyond the necessity of putting food on the table. Labour gives way to capital just as freedom gives way to necessity. Labour has to be minimized, rather than returned to its medieval form on this latter account. Marx's utopia, finally, makes peace with industrialism in *Capital* rather than seeking to overthrow it. Thus, the Marx that appealed so deeply to the student movement of the 1960s was the early Marx, the countercultural Marx, whereas the Marx of the intellectuals in the French Communist Party was the author of *Capital*, who showed how hard it was to change the world.

The fifth final, and suggestive, image of utopia in Marx is more provisional. It comes in the form of a theoretical dispensation to his Russian followers who, late in his life, wrote asking Marx's advice. Would they have to wait a hundred years more for the development of capitalism in Russia before their great-grandchildren could make socialism there? Probably, in retrospect, Marx should have remained theoretically consistent with the logic of his position, for which socialism necessarily followed capitalism, even more emphatically at the end of his life. The advice that he gave to his Russian followers was more politically supportive than it was theoretically consistent. Marx's letters to Vera Zasulich indicated that perhaps the Russians could short-circuit the process of capitalist development through the alternative development of the traditional collective form of property holding, the *mir*. The image of a local Russian socialism is implicit retrospectively in Lenin's New Economic Policy in 1921. Then Stalin—in this at least a good Westernizer—began the ruthless path of

Soviet forced industrialization and collectivization into the later 1920s. The figure of Marx now became an icon for a regime that forced labour and destroyed freedom rather than cultivating creativity of any human kind, which did more damage to its people in the name of primitive socialist accumulation than the developmental path of pioneering British capitalism ever achieved.

Marx's political legacy follows out through the tradition of classical social democracy. Hijacked by the bolsheviks after 1917, Marxism became globally synonymous with communism of the Soviet kind. Marx's work, which had emerged as a critical theory via the critique of political economy, was transformed by the bolsheviks into an ideology of state power for the modernizing project of third world regimes. Marx's critical legacy was maintained on the margin, by libertarians and social democrats, and extended later by the legacies of Western Marxism and critical theory. *Post-Marxism* became its caricature into the new century, after the collapse of the Soviet empire and the emergence of turbo capitalism under the aura of globalization. The post-Marxists are often entirely orthodox; they presume that Marx and Engels already grasped the essential reality of our contemporary world, today, within the prose imagery of *The Communist Manifesto*. They agree that Marx's best diagnosis is summed up in the maxim "All that is solid melts into air." But this is a mistranslation, both in the literal and the historical or theoretical sense. Rather, Marx says in the German original that all that stands, estate-like, disappears like vapour. The image is specific, and refers to capitalism's dissolution of feudalism, not to a universal axiom concerning the imperative of change. The more powerful image in *The Communist Manifesto* remains that of the sorcerer's apprentice. The power of the critique of capital, alienation, and commodification make it impossible to imagine modern social theory without Marx, even as we now imagine modernity differently into a new millennium.

— Peter Beilharz

See also Marxism; Post-Marxism; Socialism

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MARXISM

Marxism is the organized movements and theories established in Karl Marx's name, claiming to follow and set into practice his theories after his death in 1883. Marx is reputed to have said, in disgust at the quality of thinking of his French followers, that if these were Marxists, then he was not a Marxist at all. Marx and Engels nevertheless set about seeking to establish Marxism as a scientific rather than merely utopian socialism, and set out equally to place Marxism as the leading force in the formative international workingmen's movement. The history of Marxism is caught up with the history of the four internationals.

During his later life in exile in Britain, Marx's influence on the German social democrats took time to consolidate. The combined German Marxist party was formed in 1875. By the turn of the twentieth century, the German social democrats had become the first mass political party in the world and the subject of Roberto Michels's pioneering study in political sociology, *Political Parties*. It was a Marxist party, a party claiming to follow Marx. During Marx's lifetime, the more immediate object of struggle was the First or Workingmen's International. It was replaced by the Second International in 1889. As the German Social Democratic Party came to dominate global Marxism in this period, so did it dominate the Second International. The Second International collapsed in 1914, when German social democrats voted in parliament for war credits for World War I. With their successful seizure of state power in October 1917, the bolsheviks replaced the German social democrats as the dominant Marxist movement and in turn established the Third Communist International in 1921. Under Stalin, the Comintern became the arm of Soviet imperialism and was disbanded by Stalin in 1943 as a peace gesture to the Allies. In 1938, Leon Trotsky, the great bolshevik revolutionary forced by Stalin into exile in Mexico, proclaimed the Fourth International. International Trotskyism, taking its cue from Trotsky's 1938 *Transitional Program for Socialist Revolution*, proceeded to split multiply across the remainder of the twentieth century, often over the question whether to work within the larger socialist or labour parties or to work independently or follow other successful revolutionary movements such as those in

Cuba or Nicaragua. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 is widely interpreted as indicating the end not only of communism or socialism but also of Marxism, though Marxism as a theory has become a permanent fixture in the academy, and its presence as the remaining critique of dominant global capitalism persists.

Marxism as a movement or series of movements has been different and had a distinctive fate than any other such social theory. The social theories of Durkheim and Weber generated no isms or ideologies to follow them. The only other social theorist to have a public influence in any way comparable to Marx was Freud, not at the level of state power or politics, but in the extraordinary spread of psychoanalysis, particularly in America. Marx's work, which proclaimed itself as a critique of ideology, follows the peculiar historical path in which it becomes an ideology, first of reform or opposition with the German social democrats, then of revolution and state power with the bolsheviks. By the 1930s, Soviet Marxism became the face of the most brutal state power alongside the Nazis, though it is important to recognise that there were always those Marxists who repudiated bolshevism from the start, and others who paid with their lives for standing against Stalinism in the name of Marxism and socialism. Marxism has always been a contested legacy.

The history and significance of Marxism after Marx is by no means limited to the Internationals, though it is often connected to them. German or classical social democracy, and then bolshevism or communism, became major historic facts and institutions of the twentieth century. Viewed as a social theory or set of social theories, Marxism proliferated in various ways as critiques of the world rather than as ideologies of movements seeking to change it and institutionalise alternative regimes of state power. While there is a long tradition of conservative thinking that views Marx's work as the necessary and sufficient precondition of Soviet communism, there is also an alternative stream for which Marxism is best understood as critical theory, for which the Frankfurt school is the exemplary tradition. For the critical theory of the Frankfurt school, Marxism was a German movement whose moment was lost in the failure of the labour movement to preempt Hitler and begin to install international socialism first. Viewed from the perspective of Gramsci or later, Habermas, the central weakness in Marx's theory was its economism, or its lack of theory of politics. Marx's Eleventh Thesis on Feuerbach insisted that the point was not to interpret the world but to change it. But how? And who were the actors responsible for initiating change? Marx's fatal decision to locate the anatomy of civil society in political economy resulted in the assertion of the necessity of proletarian revolution, and ascribed the role of revolutionary agent to the proletariat, whether they wanted it or not. Socialism, counterposed to capitalism, subsumed the idea of democracy to itself but failed to specify the

mechanisms by which democracy could be promoted and extended. The standard Marxist contempt for representative democracy always left these Marxists on the outside.

The classical Marxists of the German Social Democratic Party followed Marx's economistic sensibility, for which socialism followed capitalism as evening follows day. The German social democrats, especially Karl Kautsky, who became its leading theorist and codifier, read Marx as Darwin and viewed Marxism as an evolutionary theory: first feudalism, then capitalism, within which would mature and finally emerge socialism, by definition an industrialized large-scale utopia. Capitalism was merely a husk, a cover for the next stage. This meant, for Kautsky, that the German social democrats were a revolutionary but not a revolution-making party (his predecessor, August Bebel, was fond of the view that socialism would fall into the laps of socialists like ripe fruit). Social democracy in Germany became an alternative culture, a society within a society, a project of internal institution building rather than revolution. For Kautsky, the long-term scenario was one in which class polarization would naturally divide the two great classes, bourgeoisie and proletariat, diminishing the numbers of the former as it increased those of the latter, to the point at which the vast majority of the population would be not only proletarian but also socialist, for here the continuity of identity was presumed. This kind of "maturational socialism" by the 1890s resulted in the culture of fatalism that called out the Revisionist controversy, in which the major actors were not Kautsky, who sat in the middle, but Eduard Bernstein, arguing for reform, and Rosa Luxemburg, advocating revolution. Bernstein's diagnosis of the situation for socialists was exactly the opposite of Kautsky's: There was no process of class polarization, the middle class was growing rather than shrinking, capitalist crises did not worsen, socialist revolution was not around the corner, and therefore the challenges of democratic politics moved centre stage.

Bernstein's was a rare voice, arguing that socialism was desirable rather than necessary: Its prospects depended not on guarantees of necessity or assurances that capitalism would collapse but on the expression and articulation of popular will (what Gramsci would later call "counterhegemony"). The pragmatic Bernstein, witnessing the inconsistency between the Social Democratic Party's revolutionary rhetoric and its reformist practice, argued for bringing rhetoric into line with practice. Rosa Luxemburg argued to the contrary, that if practice failed to live up to revolutionary claims, then practice should move left, not theory accommodated right. The dispute was as telling as it was lively, for it served to highlight Marx's fateful legacy: The SPD had no theory of transformative politics. Bernstein argued, by default, for the introduction of a politics of citizenship, which looked to his opponents and others like the substitution of liberalism for Marxism. Bernstein was

ridiculed as a reformer, and charged with Fabianism to boot. The controversy was dual in nature. It involved not only reformism but also revisionism. To call practically for reforms was one thing. To insist that the theoretical tradition of revolutionary Marxism be revised, brought formally into line with this reformism, was another. Bernstein sought both to pursue political reform and to reform or revise Marxist orthodoxy, to mainstream Marxism as social democracy. Luxemburg had little better to offer, except for the telling critique that an accumulation of reforms would not add up to the qualitative social change that Marxism had stood for, this accompanied by a spontaneist insistence that the mass would indeed rise as a class, where no vanguard party would be necessary. Luxemburg remained revolutionary to the end; she remained a vehement critic of bolshevism, of Lenin's dictatorship, and of what she called Soviet barracks socialism.

Kautsky was practically the victor of the reform versus revolution debate, as its result by default was to restate the status quo: Social democracy was a revolutionary but not a revolution-making party. The contradiction was crowned in the 1890 Erfurt Program, where Kautsky's revolutionary maximum program was followed by Bernstein's minimum program, with no transitional program in between. The impasse was broken by the bolsheviks, with the theory and practice of the revolutionary combat party exemplified in the October Revolution. The German social democrats were eclipsed globally by the success of the bolsheviks in 1917 and then destroyed locally by the Nazis after their rise to power in 1933. The greatest institution of classical or European Marxism was no more. Its strongest, indirect legacy was to occur elsewhere, by transmission, in Sweden, where the Swedish Social Democratic Party, guided by the para-Keynesian ideas of Ernst Wigforss, became the natural party of government, opening the way to the project of wage earners' funds via Rudolf Meidner into the 1980s. [The Swedish Social Democrats had a clearer sense of purpose than their German teachers ever achieved. Their sense of mission was, first, to pursue political democracy or citizenship, then social democracy or social rights, and last, economic democracy, or social ownership. Theirs was a Marxist program that put muscle on T. H. Marshall's 1950 statement *Citizenship and Social Class*, and was only to be eroded by the new wave of globalization into the 1980s.]

Lenin had imbibed social democracy from Plekhanov, the Russian equivalent of Kautsky. As late as 1899, Lenin still argued forcefully in *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* that capitalism came before socialism, and must do so; there were no shortcuts to socialism. Lenin was a social democrat, and his party was called the Russian Social Democratic Party. The breach in this position arrived in 1902, in *What Is to Be Done*, where Lenin introduced the idea of the revolutionary combat party. Doubtless conditions in Russia did not favour the early emergence of liberal

democracy; but Lenin turned the small vanguard party of activists into a virtue. The party was the solution to the problem of the missing theory of politics in Marx. It was only in 1917, however, that Lenin finally decided the time to seize power was ripe; the other bolshevik leaders demanded they wait, and Trotsky did not become a bolshevik until mid-1917, earlier showing solidarity with the Mensheviks, whose theory and politics were closer to those of the mainstream German social democrats. Lenin's political flexibility saw him argue for both the seizure of power in 1917 and for the introduction of capitalist economic elements in the New Economic Policy of 1921. The period of War Communism intervened.

The young Trotsky had argued a position similar to Luxemburg's, railing against Lenin's dictatorial style in his 1904 *Our Political Tasks*. In the 1905 revolution, his politics were more like Gramsci's in his conciliar period with the occupation of the factories of Turin in 1918. This most intellectual of Marxists, Trotsky favoured the intellectual climate of Vienna until becoming more bolshevik than the bolsheviks after 1917. His exceptional skills as military commissar during the civil war did not translate into ordinary political corridor skills; he was exiled by Stalin in 1927 and murdered on Stalin's orders in Mexico in 1940. Trotskyism became the standard halfway house for disillusioned bolsheviks. Having pioneered Marxist historical sociology in the fine volume of essays *1905*, Trotsky also generated one of the most powerful if ultimately unconvincing works of Marxist political sociology in his critique of the Soviet Union, *The Revolution Betrayed*, which claimed that the U.S.S.R. was in transition from capitalism to socialism, more socialist than not, as its property forms had been nationalized and it formally remained a workers' state, even if deformed in its institutions and political life. Trotsky's embrace of bolshevism saw him accept the single most central principle, which he hitherto vehemently rejected—the centrality of the party. As he later was to put it, none of the bolsheviks could be right against the Party; this was a matter of "my party, right or wrong." Trotsky became the most bolshevik of bolsheviks, arguing for the militarization of labour and the Americanization of bolshevism, waxing lyrical in *Literature and Revolution* for the developmentalist utopia where humans and nature would be engineered to perfection. Marginalized politically, Trotsky was left with these fantasies while Stalin actually set about forcing industrialization and collectivization onto the Russians.

Into the 1930s, Stalinism became the dominant form of Marxism in the Soviet Union, the Third International, and the international Marxist movement. The Comintern became the global tool of Soviet power, and Stalinism became the dominant left ideology. Stalin insisted on the possibility of the construction of "socialism in one country," resisted by Trotsky, reviving the earlier slogan of Permanent Revolution, for which socialism would be international or it

would not be at all, while all revolutions that commenced as bourgeois in the twentieth century would be compelled to become socialist in character. Plainly, Stalin's sense of realpolitik was more acute than Trotsky's, but the extent of the crimes to which Stalin was prepared to go, not least in engineering famine in the Ukraine in the name of attacking the middle peasantry and escalating the levels of incarceration in prison camps opened by Lenin, placed Stalin on a level of barbarism similar to that achieved by Hitler, perhaps worse. Marxist theory under Stalin was reduced to the hackneyed clichés of dialectical materialism and historical materialism, indicating alleged laws of nature and society that must be obeyed. Socialism entered its blackest moment. There were always voices of dissent, but too many socialists were suckers for the image of success implied and the aura conferred by Soviet state power. Stalinism was criticised and opposed by Trotskyists, earlier by the left opposition of Kollontai, by left radicals like Victor Serge and Ante Ciliga, by the council communists from Anton Pannekoek in Holland to Paul Mattick in the United States, by the Frankfurt school and Korsch, in a more compromised way by Western Marxist Lukács, whose peace with bolshevism was made early and adhered to.

Western Marxism, so-called after the fact, refers to the thinking of Europeans such as Gramsci, Lukács, and Korsch. If the axis of world Marxism had shifted to the East with the bolsheviks, and even if bolshevism was for these theorists exemplary in its activism, a new sense emerged that bolshevism could not serve as a universal model. In the East, in Russia, the old regime was rotten and could be knocked over. In the West, it was dug in, implicating individuals and classes as consumers and voters. As Lukács argued in *History and Class Consciousness*, the founding text of Western and Weberian Marxism, reification ruled in the West. To change the Western world would depend on understanding how it worked, and how in particular culture socialized individuals into accepting it. The revolution in the West would be slow. Within the communist sphere of influence, the Italian communist leader after Gramsci, Palmiro Togliatti, proclaimed polycentrism or the multiplicity of communisms into the 1950s, and alternative variations on the communist theme were exercised by Kardelji in Yugoslavia as socialist self-management, under Imre Nagy in Hungary and in Poland. Dissident reform communists emerged in each of these experiences, opening the way to the East European critical theory of the Budapest school and the Polish radicals including Zygmunt Bauman. Radical Trotskyists broke with Trotsky to form Socialisme ou Barbarie with Castoriadis and Lefort in France, differently with Michel Pablo in Algeria, C. L. R. James and Raya Dunayevskaya in the United States. Communism in America never held the appeal of Marxism, though some great thinkers like W. E. B. Du Bois joined the Communist Party of the United States of America.

Other American intellectuals supported Marxism and then turned. Among the more powerful thinkers involved were Sidney Hook, Max Eastman, and Daniel Bell. American Marxism was strong in political economy, as in the work of Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy on capitalism and imperialism, and later in the world systems analysis of Immanuel Wallerstein and his cothinkers. Maverick sociologists connecting Marx to the mainstream included C. Wright Mills and Alvin Gouldner. The intellectual influence of Trotskyism as the party and nonparty loyal Marxist opposition was extraordinary. Its ambit included figures of extraordinary appeal, like Trotsky's biographer, Isaac Deutscher, American Trotskyists such as Irving Howe, and a whole generation of writers and theorists such as Perry Anderson connected with the British *New Left Review*. The Marxist economist most influential on the work of Fredric Jameson, Ernest Mandel, was a lifelong Trotskyist activist. Alternative trends flowered in Paris via the influence of Lefebvre, and earlier, Hyppolite and Kojève, who pioneered the French reading of Hegel's *Phenomenology* and influenced a whole generation that would later become largely structuralists.

The Soviet hegemony over the Left was only really loosened by the Chinese Revolution in 1949 and the emergence of a serious rival Stalinism or Marxism-Leninism with Mao Zedong Thought. Marxism appealed to the Western Left, it seems, not least because of its apparent romanticism or exoticism. The image of intellectuals forced to engage in backbreaking field labour in the so-called Cultural Revolution was perversely attractive to those who at the comfort of their metropolitan distance imagined this to be a new social experiment in overcoming the division between mental and manual labour. Romantic intellectuals of the Left have long harbored sympathies for the idea of the revolution, the revolutionary rupture as new beginning, whether in the new calendar of the French Revolution or the Year Zero of Pol Pot's Kampuchean disaster two centuries later. The connections were more than incidental—Pol Pot's theorist, Khieu Samphan, learned his Marxism in Paris. In terms of the politics of Marxist social theory, Maoism offered the communist insiders an apparently radical precedent from within the tradition with which to criticise Soviet Stalinism. For even despite his precipitous voluntarism, Stalin believed that economy ruled. Khrushchev inherited his sense that Soviet communism would beat capitalism by economic indicators. Mao, in comparison, argued that politics should be placed in charge—better red than expert.

Whether leading French Marxists like Louis Althusser really believed in the superiority of Mao Zedong Thought or not, the precedent provided by Chinese "purism" gave them a radical stick with which to beat stodgy Soviet Stalinists like Brezhnev, whose corruption became legendary. For all the distaste Althusser had for humanist

Marxists like Sartre, this was one thing they had in common. Third world Marxism appealed. In Sartre's case, the most striking filiation was with Frantz Fanon's advocacy of therapeutic anticolonial violence in *The Wretched of the Earth*. Here the logic was as simple as it was devastating. If civilization, or capitalism or imperialism destroys us, then the only solution is self-evident: We from the margins have to destroy it first, or before there is any further damage. Marxists from the West, even Trotsky, had always stood against individual acts of violence and terror, on the grounds that it was the system that needed changing. Kill the tsar, and there was always a little tsar behind him. Decolonization brought with it a sense of moral urgency where, as for Fanon, the sense of emancipation was more directly caught up with the capacity or need physically to remove the master. Sartre sympathised; others, like Camus and Orwell, were horrified. For them, the very idea of exemplary violence spoke only of the reproduction of terror, not release from it. By the 1960s, the old working-class movement of the centres was looking bourgeois, complacent, and incorporated. Such was the message of Marcuse's widely influential *One Dimensional Man*. Marx had ascribed the role of social actor to the proletariat; Lukács built a theory around this. If the working class failed to act, then given the necessity of socialism, another actor must logically step up to fill its place. By the sixties, the proletariat had become a systemic insider for radical Marxists; the change agent would have to be outsiders, the equivalent of the lumpen proletariat, the social scum, or proletariat in rags derided by Marx as agents of reaction rather than revolution. The transference of authority from the nineteenth-century proletariat to the late twentieth-century marginals made sense, but only within the limited logic of a politics where collective interests, or their absence, were presumed to be the key motivational force explaining social change. Thus, the wretched truly became the inheritors of the world. Third worldism shifted hemispheres after 1959, to take in enthusiasm for the Cuban Revolution, though its dynamics were different and less ideologically driven. Cuba never quite had the appeal of China for Western radicals; support for Cuba was often more a matter of solidarity with a small power on the doorstep against the might of the United States. The retrospective enthusiasm for Che Guevara as a lost icon is similar in stature only to the cult of Trotsky and, photographically, to the cult of Jimi Hendrix.

As labour had become integrated into capitalist society especially after World War II, so did the social democratic parties become integrated as systems managers of the mixed economies. The German social democrats gave up all formal or rhetorical connection to Marxism after 1959, though Marxists and Trotskyists continued to work through its youth sections. The same process occurred in the labour parties of Britain, Australia, and New Zealand. Marxism as a theory revived into the sixties, with the translation of

Marx's early *Paris Manuscripts*, Marcuse's *One Dimensional Man*, and books by Andre Gorz, Harry Braverman, and the American Monthly Review school. Journals proliferated, such as *Studies on the Left*, *Telos*, *Socialist Register*, *Marxism Today*, and *New Left Review*. Gorz revived the old German Social Democratic Revisionist debate, practically, by introducing arguments for what he called "revolutionary reforms," which sounded like Bernstein's project of accumulating reforms but claimed to escalate them together in a spirit closer to Gramsci's. Later, into the 1980s, these hopes helped fuel Left popular arguments for an Alternative Economic Strategy, which would consolidate and extend the national basis of social democratic reform by developing industry policy and self-management. *New Left Review* became a meter of Marxist theory, beginning with a more humanist and local phase, partly driven by the Peace and Nuclear Disarmament Movement, through to the headier days of Vietnam. The fare shifted from thinkers like Sartre to tougher French communists such as Althusser. Within the Marxist tradition of social theory, this marked a reversal, back to the image of scientific socialism.

Althusser's politics were those identified with Mao and Lenin, but his intellectual imperatives were closer to Lacan, Spinoza, Montesquieu, and Rousseau. His arrival coincided with the structuralist wave, when thinkers such as Lévi-Strauss, Foucault, and Lacan became extraordinarily influential in Paris, and, by English relay, throughout its intellectual dependencies. Structuralism did not break in America until the arrival of its literary turn, in deconstruction, and via Yale and then through the American travels of Foucault. Marxist structuralism was a peculiar mix of these structural orientations, which were often explicitly denied by thinkers such as Althusser, and the more conventional period communist interests in Gramsci, Lenin (but not, in Paris, Trotsky, who belonged to the Trotskyists), and Mao, together with the powerful image of the Cultural Revolution. Freud sat in the back of this grouping, as structuralist Marxism's interest in culture and consciousness included curiosity concerning psychology and the mind. How did capitalism subject us, make us subjects of its processes, make us love consumption? How could we break out of capitalism? The moment of break, apparently, came in 1968, when student strikes in Paris drew 10 million workers onto the streets; but the Communist Party leadership, wary of adventurism, failed to push the masses forward, and de Gaulle eventually sent the workers back to their homes with increased wage packets. May 1968 encapsulated the whole problem, for Marxists. It proved that the capitalist world could stop and that extraordinary creative energies might be released as a result; and it proved that, once the party was over, the world would go back to capitalist business as usual. Perhaps May 1968 was the last chance at *revolution*; perhaps it represented larger historical forces of modernization and smaller cultural moments of

efflorescence. Whatever the case, the French Communist Party made it plain that it did not want to lead a revolution. The leading communist parties, those of France and Italy (followed by Spain), had become, in period talk, social-democratized. They were managerial institutions, working a particular cultural and economic constituency connected to radical intellectuals and the working-class movement, whose purpose was like the labour parties to protect their interests and advance them where this could be done without risks of repercussion.

The image of social democracy they called up was somewhere between the fin-de-siècle achievements of the German society within a society and the postwar German image of sound corporate management and growth. The Latin communist parties made their last bid for increased power into the seventies in the form of the French Union of the Left and the Italian Historic Compromise. The French Union of the Left involved a coalition with the French Socialist Party, from which the Communist Party had split in 1920. The Italian Historic Compromise was partly referred back to the Gramscian idea of historic bloc, expanded to take in all larger political parties in an alliance of national popular unity. Generically, this movement became known as Eurocommunism, to set it apart from Soviet communism. The initiative at first stalled and was then taken over by changes in the Soviet Union under Gorbachev, which saw communism marginalized as a world force. Perhaps this was inevitable, as communism represented a global attempt on the part of the bolsheviks and then Stalin and his followers to universalize the particular experience of the Russian Revolution. It was the phenomenon of the Russian Revolution that prompted Max Weber to comment to his younger friend, Lukács, that this experience would set socialism back one hundred years.

Marxism, itself the product of intellectuals as much as the workers' movement, lives on in a cultural form in universities and their milieu, not least as post-Marxism. Indeed, Marxism has become part of the popular culture it articulated, in the sense that economy rules, and globalization with it. What has gone is the idea that Marxism offers an alternative way of life, rather than a critique of actually existing capitalism. Marxism as a social theory remains influential in the critique of capitalism and imperialism; through its influence in sociology, not least in league with the insights of Weber that were connected by Lukács and driven on by the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt school; in cultural studies, via Gramsci, geography via Lefebvre, and so on. In less explicit ways, the influence of Marxism can be encountered in mediated forms in the sociology of Pierre Bourdieu, where cultural capital reflects capital in Marx's sense, and social action is circumscribed still by senses of economic interest, as in the sociology of Alain Touraine, where the idea of a single central social actor or subject for

each phase of societal development still echoes Marx, long after the dream of revolution has evaporated.

— Peter Beilharz

See also Exploitation; Historical Materialism; Marx, Karl; Post-Marxism; Socialism

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MATERNAL THINKING

A term coined by Sara Ruddick (1980; 1995), maternal thinking refers to the values, intellectual capacities, and metaphysical attitudes that may arise from the daily work of mothering children, whether that work is done by women or men or by biological or adoptive mothers. In developing this concept, Ruddick drew on the philosophical traditions of Wittgenstein, Winch, and Habermas, which treat thought as arising from social practice. At the same time, she contributed to the strong current within 1970s and 1980s feminist scholarship that highlights the value of activities conventionally associated with women.

Maternal practice, Ruddick argues, is governed by three universal but culturally and historically shaped "demands" of children. First, children demand preservation. Protecting a child in the face of life's fragility produces the attitude of "holding," of viewing the world with an eye toward keeping the child safe, knowing one cannot completely control the environment. Second, children demand nurturance. Helping the child grow physically, intellectually, and emotionally requires the capacity to welcome and understand complex, unpredictable change, both in children and in oneself. Third, children demand training so that they may achieve social acceptance. Fostering the child's moral and social development requires cultivating openness to the child's potential, including the child's potential difference from oneself. A mother also needs to

model conscientiousness, resisting blind acceptance of her community's values.

Ruddick emphasizes that mothers are not inherently peaceful; some mothers neglect or abuse their children, and many mothers support the military actions of their sons, lovers, and states. Nonetheless, she proposes that maternal thought can be a resource for peacemaking. Drawing on the ideas of Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr., she identifies four principles that may arise from efforts to protect, nurture, and train children: renouncing violence against the vulnerable, resisting injustice in one's home or community, seeking reconciliation while holding people responsible for their actions, and keeping the peace when justice has been attained.

The greatest challenge for maternal thought is moving beyond protecting, nurturing, and training one's own children at the expense of others, thereby perpetuating racism, classism, and other forms of injustice and violence. And yet Ruddick finds that maternal thought can be a resource for a broader politics of resistance. For example, the Madres of Argentina, who resisted their government's kidnapping, torturing, and murdering of "the disappeared," connected their fight for their children to the violence others suffer worldwide. Ruddick also claims that when mothers develop a feminist consciousness, they come to see clearly the harm they have suffered as well as inflicted on others, and they may come to understand connections between those forms of violence and state-sponsored violence. While feminism itself does not necessarily oppose all forms of violence, a maternal politics informed by feminism encourages the extension of local concerns to a global concern for all children.

In theorizing maternal thinking, Ruddick claims universality not for mothers' situations but for children's demands for preservation, nurturance, and training. She also acknowledges that she theorizes as a white, heterosexual, partnered, middle-class American woman. Some feminist critics, however, find that Ruddick's theorizing slips too easily into generalizing from privileged mothers' circumstances. Patricia Hill Collins, for instance, developed the concept of *motherwork* based on the experiences of poor and working-class mothers of color in American society. These mothers struggle for their children's survival, teach their children to preserve their identities in a racist society, and fight for empowerment in a society that exploits their labor.

Other feminist scholars who focus on women's social locations modify rather than criticize the concept of maternal thinking. For example, Nancy Scheper-Hughes (1996) explores maternal thinking under conditions of severe deprivation in Brazil. Rather than seeking to preserve life, extremely impoverished mothers develop the mental habit of "letting go," of resigning themselves to the deaths of infants who "need" or "want" to die. Scheper-Hughes finds